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Abstract 
     Using Japan‟s prefecture-level panel data from 1989-2001, this paper examines 
the influence of the social norm on a person‟s smoking behavior when the 
complementary relationship between smoking and drinking is taken into account.  
The key findings through a dynamic panel model controlling for unobserved 
prefecture-specific fixed effects are as follows: (1) Influence from others is stronger 
when people live more closely and cohesively. A tightly knit society results in a 
reduction of smoking through smoking-related interaction. (2) Smoking and drinking 
have a complementary relationship, and it is stronger when the consumption of alcohol 
is greater at the start. (3) The complementary relationship between smoking and 
dinking is attenuated if the cost of committing the annoying conduct (i.e., smoking) is 
high.     
  Overall, this empirical study provides evidence that the psychological effect of the 
presence of surrounding people has a direct significant effect upon smoking behavior 
and, further, that it attenuates the complementary relationship between smoking and 
drinking, thereby reducing cigarette consumption.  These results indicate that not 
only formal rules but also tacitly formed informal norms are effective deterrents to 
smoking.  
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I. Introduction 
It is generally acknowledged that Japan‟s per capita cigarette consumption and 
smoking rate has been remarkably high among major industrialized nations (World 
Bank, 1999).  However, in Japan some literature has pointed out that compared with 
other industrialized nations, the government did not sufficiently make an effort to 
raise public awareness about the health hazards of smoking (Yorozu and Zhou, 2002; 
Luo et al., 2003)1.  For instance, Yorozu and Zhou (2002) refer to the absence of 
antismoking ordinances and regulations and the lack of dissemination of information 
about the health hazards of smoking.  Nonetheless, the consumption of cigarettes has 
declined gradually in Japan.  Thus, given that the formal rules and laws enacted by 
the government were not sufficiently effective in reducing cigarette consumption, there 
should be other mechanisms involved in the control of smoking which has lead to a 
reduction of cigarette consumption.   
A person innately does not pay much attention to which side of the road they 
drive on, and thus they would normally choose to simply drive on the same side as 
everyone else.  This phenomenon shows an aspect of human nature that relates to 
social existence.  The influence of the attitude and conduct of others on a person‟s 
behavior seems apparent among neighbors and colleagues in schools and workplaces 
(Beker and Murphy, 2000; Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Crane, 1991; Evans et al., 1992; 
Gaviria and Rapahel, 2001; Glaeser et al., 1996; Manski, 1993).  The interactive 
mechanism above also applies to a person‟s choice of demand behavior.  What others 
consume stimulates a person‟s demand for it as well.  That is to say, the more popular 
goods are, the more people want them.  Consequently, interactions among people 
through conversations and daily life may affect aggregated demand behavior toward 
goods such as cigarettes (Powell et al., 2005).  When this interactive mechanism is 
considered, as Coleman (1990) pointed out, actors harmed by an action that benefits 
the actor in control of the action experience negative externalities, as exemplified by 
nonsmokers sitting near a smoker. The problem for nonsmokers, therefore, is how to 
limit such actions taken by smokers.   
Compared with Europe or North America, in general the smoking prevalence of 
females is remarkably lower than that of males in the Asian nations of Japan, Korea, 
                                                   
1 The situation in Korea is similar (Kim and Seldon, 2004).  Other existing work 
examining smoking behavior in Asia includes Japan (Haden, 1990) and China 
(Yuanliang and Zongyi, 2005). 
Thailand, and Singapore.  For example, the smoking prevalences of males and 
females in the U.S.A are 27.7% and 22.5 %, respectively.  On the other hand, those of 
Japan are 59.0 % and 14.8 %, respectively (Worldbank, 1999).  These data imply that 
as a whole the smoking prevalence of Japan is higher than that of the U.S.A, although 
that of females is distinctly lower in Japan than in the U.S.A. Japan ratified its 
“Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women” in 
1979 at the United Nations General Assembly2.  Consequently females have risen in 
social standing and therefore have a larger influence on the social lives of the Japanese.  
With regard to smoking, most females in Japan are non-smokers who dislike smoking 
behavior.  As the social status of females has risen, the anti-smoking atmosphere has 
become more prevalent3.  Such an atmosphere also seems to shape the general 
anti-smoking social norm in Japan. 
  If one smokes in a public place and the surrounding people indicate their 
annoyance against him, then the person may feel embarrassed and thereby generate 
the psychological cost of committing the rude behavior of smoking.  The psychological 
cost of smoking depends on anti-smoking social norms, which are shaped by local 
interactions (Funk, 2005).  Furthermore, the apprehension of bad behavior such as 
crime or smoking depends on the watchfulness of citizens (Huck and Kosfeld, 2007).  
Neighborhood watch is likely to be more effective if the community members are more 
closely related.  Accordingly, assuming that neighborhood watch and psychological 
cost are complementary and that the majority of a community’s members consist of 
nonsmokers, then the social norm that bans community members from smoking will be 
stronger in a more cohesive community.  In the long run, the entire community will 
come to ostracize those who break such informal rules, such as smokers (Posner and 
Rasmusen, 1999).  I believe that informal rules such as social norms are the key 
determinants of the attitudes of smokers in Japan.  This is why in this study I pay 
particular attention to the role of social norms in the regulation of smoker attitudes 
and thus include the proxy variables of social disorganization4.   
      The empirical study of Dee (1999) and Gruber et al. (2003) provides evidence of a 
robust complementarity between cigarettes and alcohol 5 .  To put it differently, 
                                                   
2 See http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/. 
3 Due to limitations of data, the effect of females on cigarette consumption is not 
directly estimated in this research. 
4 The cohesiveness of society has another aspect as well.  According to Putnam (2000), 
social networks built in a cohesive society may reinforce healthy norms, socially 
isolated people are more likely to smoke ore engage in various health damaging 
behaviors. 
5 Recently, Arcidacono et al. (2007) also investigate the relationship between smoking 
reductions in drinking are associated with a lower prevalence of smoking.  Such a 
complemetarity seems to be affected by the informal social norm created through the 
watchfulness of the neighborhood or colleagues at work.  The anti-smoking social 
norm appears to attenuate the complementarity between smoking and drinking.  
Nevertheless, the empirical links between social norms and complementary goods has 
yet to be considered in the literature.  Therefore, the object of this paper is to explore 
such links using the panel data of Japan from 47 Japanese prefectures for the years 
1989-2001 and controlling for unobservable fixed effects.  The contribution of this 
paper is a combined analysis of the importance of the social norm and complementary 
goods on smoking behavior. 
     This paper also contributes to the cigarette demand literature by examining the 
determinants of smoking incorporating both the direct and indirect effects of the social 
norm (via reduction of the complementarity of alcohol consumption) on smoking 
behavior.  The organization of this paper is as follows:  Section 2 surveys cigarette 
consumption in Japan and advances a testable hypothesis.  Section 3 presents the 
simple econometric framework.  Section 4 discusses the results of the estimations.  
The final section offers concluding observations. 
 
II. Review of cigarette consumption in Japan 
 Review 
   I begin this section by studying the figures that outline the current state of 
smoking in Japan.  A cursory examination of Figure 1, which demonstrates the 
transition of per capita consumption of cigarettes in Japan, suggests that consumption 
has declined gradually over time.  Subsequently, Figure 2 illustrates the average per 
capita consumption of cigarettes by prefecture for both high alcohol consumption and 
low consumption groups, which are equally divided by the initial year ‟s alcohol 
consumption6.  Figure 2 reveals that the consumption of cigarettes by the high alcohol 
consumption group is obviously higher than that of the low alcohol consumption group.  
On the other hand, the downward slope of the high alcohol consumption group is 
steeper than that of the low alcohol consumption group.  This implies that the 
consumption of alcohol is positively associated with that of cigarettes and that the 
decrease in the consumption of cigarettes is more evident in the high alcohol 
consumption group than in the low consumption group.  In other words, although the 
complementarity of smoking and drinking can be observed, it becomes weaker over 
                                                                                                                                                     
and drinking. 
6 The initial year is defined as 1989. 
time in prefectures where alcohol consumption is higher in the initial year.  As a 
result, the difference in smoking consumption between them diminishes over time. 
The relationship between cigarettes and alcohol consumption is also indicated in 
Figure 3, in which alcohol and cigarette consumption are represented in the horizontal 
and the vertical axis, respectively.  Further, Figures 3 a) and 3 b) show the high and 
low alcohol consumption groups, respectively, which are divided in a same manner of 
Figure 2.  From these figures, it can be seen that a positive relationship is observed 
more clearly in Figure 3 a) than in Figure 3 b), meaning that the complementarity 
between drinking and smoking is more obvious if the consumption of alcohol is higher.      
     To sum up the evidence presented above, smoking is associated more positively 
with drinking despite the fact that their complementarity declines more rapidly in the 
areas where the consumption of alcohol is higher. 
 
Hypothesis 
      As earlier suggested, the per capita cigarette consumption in Japan has 
dominated industrialized nations in recent years.  However, there is a remarkable 
difference in the smoking prevalences of males and females, which are about 60 % and 
15 %, respectively (World bank, 1999).  A growing body of literature suggests that 
social interaction mechanisms may be crucial determinants of behavior.  It is asserted 
that an increase in the prevalence of a given behavior at the peer level may lead to an 
increased probability of such behavior at the individual level (Manski, 1993; Becker, 
1996; Becker and Murphy, 2000; Glaeser et al., 1996).  Assuming that the society 
consists mainly of males in Japan, there may be a social interaction mechanism that 
enhances the prevalence of smoking since the majority of people in the society are 
smokers.  Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that females have a relatively low social 
position in Japan.  Under such circumstances, it is generally believed to be merely a 
matter of etiquette in Japan to ask another person sitting beside one for permission to 
smoke (Yorozu and Zhou, 2002).  
       However, recently the social position of females has improved and females have 
become influential in the modern society of Japan.  This change reflects the Equal 
Employment Opportunities Law for Men and Women, which was enacted in 1985 in 
order to improve the employment opportunities of females.  In the process of their rise 
in social position, females tend to increase their influence on modern social behaviors 
such as smoking at workplaces and accelerate the social norm of “not smoking for the 
sake of nonsmokers” through smoking-related interaction 7 .  The higher the 
                                                   
7 Smoking related interactions are supposed as follows: A female tends to ask smokers 
psychological cost, the stronger the nonsmoking norm becomes.  The strength of 
nonsmoking norms plays a critical role in deterring members of a society from smoking.  
In short, as the social standing of females improves, the nonsmoking social norm 
emerges and leads to decreases in cigarette consumption.  Informal norm enforcement 
among interacting male and female members of society tends to be stronger and more 
effective if the members communicate more cohesively and closely (Putnam, 2000).  
Accordingly I raise the following Hypothesis 1 concerning the effect of social norms on 
smoking.   
 
Hypothesis 1: A tightly knit society can achieve a reduction in smoking through 
smoking-related interaction.  
 
Dee (1999) presents evidence of the complementarity of drinking and smoking 
that is in line with the findings shown in the figures presented in the previous 
subsection.  In addition to their complementarity, both cigarettes and alcohol are 
considered to be addictive goods, such that the initial consumption of alcohol is 
positively associated with the subsequent consumption of cigarettes.  Hence, my 
conjecture is that their complementarity tends to have the property of addictive goods.  
Thus the past consumption of alcohol should stimulate the current complementarity 
between smoking and drinking.  Accordingly, I advance the following empirical 
Hypothesis 2 concerning this complementarity. 
. 
Hypothesis 2: The complementarity of smoking and drinking is stronger when the 
consumption of alcohol is greater initially.  
 
The psychological cost of committing a rude behavior comes from the 
watchfulness of the neighborhood or colleagues at a workplace.  On the condition that 
the cost rises, smokers drink but are less likely to smoke at the party where 
nonsmokers are present even if smokers would like to jointly consume cigarettes and 
alcohol.  This psychological cost is expected to have an influence not only directly on 
smoking but also indirectly on its complementarity.  As a consequence, I postulate 
Hypothesis 3 with respect to the effects of the informal social norm upon smoking. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The complementarity between smoking and dinking is attenuated if the 
                                                                                                                                                     
at work not to smoke.  When females are equally employed as males, then smokers 
are more likely to be informed that their smoke bothers someone at work.   
cost of committing the annoying conduct of smoking is high. 
 
III Model 
 Data 
 
     Except for cigarette price, data used in the regression estimation as independent 
variables are collected from Asahi Shinbunsha (various years).  The price data is 
obtained from the Japan Statistical Yearbook (various years) published by the 
Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication. The 
structure of the data is panel, consisting of 47 prefectures and spanning 13 years (1989 
- 2001).  Hence the raw data set includes various prefecture-level data on various 
variables.  Table 1 depicts the descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in the 
regression estimation.   
 
Econometric Framework 
To test the hypotheses raised in the previous section, first I examine whether 
the social norm reduced the current cigarette consumption directly.  Second, I 
examine how the social norm attenuates the complementarity of alcohol and cigarette 
consumption. 
Following Becker and Murphy (2000), the estimated function takes the 
following myoptic addiction form8: 
 
CIGA it=   1CIGAit-1  + 2PRICit  + 3DENSit  + 4SN1it + 5SN2it+ 6DSN1it + 
7DSN2it+8ALCOL it +9INCOMit +10SERVICit +11CARit +12POPit +t + i
+uit , 
where CIGA it represents the dependent variable in prefecture i and year t. ‟s 
represents the regression parameters.  In this estimation, as the main stress does not 
fall on the rational addictive behavior, I hypothesized that current cigarette 
consumption depends on past consumption but not future consumption. If the myoptic 
addictive behavior holds, then the expected signs of the lagged CIGA and PRIC become 
positive and negative, respectively9. 
                                                   
8 The focus of this paper is not on rational addictive behavior.  I thus used the 
myoptic function form.  Nonetheless, when the rational addiction model is employed, 
the results of estimation are unchanged. 
9 Although the price measure is a single nationwide uniform cigarette price in Japan, 
the deflator is different among prefectures. The cigarette price can be deflated by the 
consumer price index, and therefore the relative cigarette price varies across 
t, iti u,  represent the unobservable specific effects in the t th year (a fixed effect 
time vector), the individual effects of i „s prefecture (a fixed effects prefecture vector) 
and an error term, respectively.  t represents the year specific effects and i  holds 
the time invariant feature, while u is an error term.  The structure of the data set 
used in this study is panel, and the independent variables include a lagged dependent 
variable.  To address potential endogenous problems with the lagged independent 
variable, I carry out dynamic panel estimation developed by Arellano-bond (Baltagi, 
2005), as dynamic panel models allow past realizations of the dependent variable to 
affect its current level.  In addition, special attention must be paid to the omitted 
variable bias stemming from unobservable individual specific effects. This can be also 
controlled for by means of dynamic panel estimation.  Year dummies were also 
incorporated to subdue t ,which represents the conditional and structural changes at 
the macro level that could affect cigarette consumption. 
 
Proxies for social norms 
 Nonsmokers would suffer seriously from the smoking of surrounding people if 
they lived in a densely populated area since the externality of smoking is strong and 
directly affects others.  Nonsmokers have a tendency to request smokers not to smoke 
or to express their annoyance with the smoking behavior.  This is why the expected 
signs of DENS representing the density of the population measured by the population 
per km2 is negative.   
 I now proceed to characterize the social norm that captures the informal social 
pressure on smokers from nonsmokers.  The cost of annoying others depends on the 
social norms, which are shaped by local interactions (Funk, 2005).  Individuals are 
more apt to smoke due to the decrease in the expected cost of annoying surrounding 
people such as community members or workplace colleagues if the community is 
disorganized and social norms are weak.  According to the view of Putnam (2000), 
social disorganization can be regarded as the engine of rude behavior. Such 
disorganization undermines the social norms and marks urban areas where population 
turnover is high, one‟s neighbors are anonymous, and local organization is rare.  The 
degree to which one is integrated into one‟s community depends upon the community‟s 
condition.  To borrow an argument of Putnam (2000), frequent movers have weaker 
ties within the community, and so mobile communities seem to have less interactivity 
among neighbors than more stable communities.  To put it differently, the more 
mobile a community is, the weaker the connectedness within it becomes.  Hence, DSN 
                                                                                                                                                     
prefectures. 
1 and DSN2, denoting the number of population turnovers within a prefecture and the 
number of immigrants from other prefectures, respectively, can be considered as 
proxies for the decay of social norms.  Accordingly, these coefficients are predicted to 
take a positive sign. 
 The following independent variables are used as proxies of the social norm.  In 
traditional Japanese daily life, public baths were used by community members who, 
apart from the wealthy, ordinarily lived in houses without a private bath.  Through 
the use of such baths people could get acquainted with neighbors and generate a social 
network.  In modern Japan, most residences have their own baths, and people are 
therefore more likely to take a bath at home.  However, a new type of public bath 
featuring more deluxe baths and saunas has recently developed, and these are used by 
all sectors of society, thus providing a place to meet neighbors and form social capital.  
The community center can be also considered as a place where people interact closely 
and enhance the cohesiveness among community members.  Therefore the number of 
public baths and community centers, represented as SN1 as SN2, respectively, where 
people can contact neighbors and deter them from annoying the others surrounding 
them, can thus also serve as a proxy for social norms.  Therefore, I expect the signs of 
SN1 and SN2 to be negative. 
 
Control variables 
In addition to the social norm, I also focus on the effects of drinking10 
following the argument of Dee (1999) that the consumption of alcohol and cigarettes 
might constitute an important case as these goods are complementary. Thus, the 
ALCOL standing for alcohol consumption is expected to take a positive sign11. 
The cost of smoking is not only psychological but also economical.  In the 
workplace, if ones customers, business partners, or counterparts dislike smoking, then 
a smoker can not build good relationships with them, and as a result team 
performance in the workplace is lowered.  In particular, the cost of smoking appears 
to be high in the service sector, as employees tend to work within a locked room and 
can suffer more health damage from smoking.  Following the enactment of a 
restrictive smoking policy (Gottlieb et al., 1990; William et al., 1999), the informal rule 
                                                   
10 The case Dee (1999) presents is of teen smoking and drinking.  I conjecture that 
this relationship holds in not only teens but also in other generations. 
11 It should be noted that the price of alcohol must be used as the explanatory variable 
in order to more precisely examine the complementarity.  However, I found difficulty 
in measuring the alcohol price since there are a number of kinds of alcohol, such as 
beer, whiskey, and wine, etc.  
of preventing smoking should also form naturally and necessarily become effective. 
Hence, SERVI, denoting the number of service sector employments, would take a 
negative sign.  Similarly, the space inside vehicles is closed, and therefore people 
riding inside vehicles should be more sensitive to smoking and to their health suffering 
more serious damage from its effects.  The sign of CAR, which represents the number 
of vehicles, is expected to be negative. 
 
3.2.4. Interaction terms with alcohol 
In the subsequent estimation, I incorporate the additional cross products of 
ALCOLit and some dependent variables as follows: DENSit*ALCOLit, SN1it*ALCOLit, 
SN2it*ALCOLit, DSN1it*ALCOLit, and DSN2it*ALCOLit.  As stated previously in 
Hypotheis 3, the complementarity between smoking and drinking becomes weaker 
when the cohesiveness of a tightly knit community leads to raising the psychological 
cost of smoking.  If this holds, then the expected signs of DENSit*ALCOLit, 
SN1it*ALCOLit,, and SN2it*ALCOLit become negative.  On the other hand, 
DSN1it*ALCOLit and DSN1it*ALCOLit are expected to take a positive sign.    
 
IV. Results 
Basic results 
    Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the dynamic panel estimations.   
Estimations were conducted using not only the whole sample shown in (1) and (4), but 
also the high alcohol consumption prefectures in columns (2) and (5) and the low 
alcohol consumption prefectures in (3) and (6).  Information derived from the 
estimations of splitting samples can be of great use for comparing the differences of 
social norm effects on smoking behavior between the two groups.  Looking at the 
second row from the bottom of Tables 2 and 3 reveals that there is no second-order 
serial correlation for disturbances of the first-differenced equation for all dynamic 
panel (GMM) estimations. Therefore, Arellano-Bond type GMM estimators are 
consistent. 
    From the results of columns (1) and (4), it can be seen that CIGA and PRIC 
take positive and negative signs, respectively, which is in line with the myoptic 
addiction model.  Turning to the key variables of this research, most of the proxies for 
the social norm or the decay of the social norm such as DENS, SN1, SN2, DSN1, and 
DSN2, take the predicted signs while being statistically significant, which is consistent 
with Hypothesis 1.  ALCOHOL, SERVI, and CAR also take the expected signs and are 
statistically significant.  INCOM takes a negative sign, implying that cigarettes are 
inferior goods. This finding is contrary to that of the existing literature (Haden, 1990; 
Yorozu and Zhou, 2002).  The reason why cigarettes become inferior goods is likely 
due to the emergence of substitute goods in the process of the economic development in 
Japan.  These results strongly support my prediction that the social norm plays an 
important role in the decrease of cigarette consumption.   
Next, let us compare the results of the high and low alcohol consumption groups. 
In particular, I will focus upon columns (2) and (3), where all explanatory variables are 
included.  In column (2), whereas the coefficients of DENS and SN1 take negative 
signs, those of DSN1 and DSN2 take positive signs, and they are all statistically 
significant with the exception of DENS and SN1.  The fact that the coefficient of 
ALCOL takes the expected positive sign implies that the complementarity of dinking 
and smoking is valid.  On the other hand, it is interesting to observe that in column 
(3) most of the proxies for the social norm or the decay of the social norm do not take 
the predicted signs, and none of them are statistically significant.  Furthermore, 
contrary to the expected result, the coefficient sign of ALCOL is negative.  When I 
compare the results of columns (5) and (6) in the alternative specification, the results 
are unchanged.  Considering Figure 2 and Table 2 together, the social norm effects on 
smoking depend upon the initial consumption of alcohol, which is positively associated 
with the initial consumption of cigarettes.  The effects of antismoking norms declined 
as the initial consumption of smoking and drinking fell, presumably because the 
smaller the externality from smoking, the less aggressive nonsmoker attitudes toward 
smokers became, which is in line with previously published results finding that the 
proportion of nonsmokers that suggested smokers to quit smoking decreased after the 
implementation of a restrictive smoking policy in the U.S.A. (Gottlieb et al., 1990).  
Another likely reason for the decrease of antismoking norms is that there becomes 
fewer opportunities for nonsmokers to express their opinions of annoyance to smokers 
as the number of places where people are allowed to smoke decreases..  In short, these 
results can be interpreted to mean the following.  (1) The social norm has a 
tremendous effect on smoking when the consumption of alcohol is high, but not when it 
is low.  (2) The complementarity between smoking and drinking depends upon the 
initial consumption of alcohol, confirming Hypotheis 2.  
The estimation results are presented in Table 3, where the problem of 
simultaneous consumption between alcohol and cigarettes is controlled for by using 
the lagged value of ALCOL.  Compared with the results shown in Table 2, I found that, 
as a whole, these results were no different, and therefore it can be concluded that both 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 were supported.     
 The impact of norms on complementarity 
  Switching now to the interaction terms of ALCOLt-1 and the proxy variables for 
the social norm or its decay, the results are shown in Table 4 and Table 5.  In columns 
(2) and (4) of both tables, population rates of 20-24, 25-39, and over 64 are used as 
additional instruments in order to control for endogeneity bias.  As the focus of this 
study is on the impact of the social norm on the complementarity of smoking and 
dinking, it can be seen from Table 4 that in all estimations, as expected, the signs of 
DENSit*ALCOLit are negative while those of DSN1it*ALCOLit and DSN2it*ALCOLit 
are positive and statistically significant with the exception of DSN2it*ALCOLit12 in 
column (3).  As for SN1it*ALCOLit, its coefficient signs are not stable although it is 
statistically insignificant in all estimations.  With respect to SN2it*ALCOLit, its 
coefficients take the predicted negative signs and are statistically significant in 
columns (3) and (4) at the 1 % level.  As shown in Tables 2 and 3, SERVI and CAR 
take significant negative signs, conforming to the expectations.   
Turning to the results of the interaction terms of the lagged ALCOL used to 
eliminate the problem of simultaneous alcohol consumption, the results in Table 5 
show that the dynamic panel estimation is suitable because there is no second-order 
serial correlation for disturbances of the first-differenced equation for all estimations13.  
Taken as a whole, the results after controlling for the endogeneity of alcohol 
consumption are the same as those shown in Table 4, and therefore are robust to 
alternative specifications.  My interpretation of the results drawn from Tables 4 and 5 
is consistent with the prediction described earlier and supports Hypothesis 3.         
        Up to this point I have presented the various estimated results of this study.  
Summing them up, I arrive at the conclusion that the estimation results examined in 
this section are consistent and reasonably support Hypotheses 1 to 3 raised in the 
preceding section.  
 
V. Conclusion 
      The consumption of cigarettes is considered to be influenced by the informal 
social norm and social interaction. Therefore, the mechanisms related to the social 
norm and social interaction seem to be more influential among industrialized countries, 
and especially in Japan since it is a relatively homogeneous society.  However, 
                                                   
12 It must be noted that there is a second-order serial correlation for disturbances of 
the first-differenced equation in columns (3) and (4). 
13 The causality of smoking and drinking is not evident, and thus the simultaneous 
problem arises.   
researchers have heretofore not paid attention to this relationship, and therefore little 
is known about the effect of the social norm on smoking behavior.  
The key findings through a dynamic panel model controlling for unobserved 
fixed effects are as follows:  
(1) The influence from others is stronger when people live more closely and cohesively 
together.  Thus, a tightly knit society can help to create a reduction of smoking 
through smoking-related interaction.  
(2) Smoking and drinking are complementary, and this relationship is stronger when 
the consumption of alcohol is greater initially.  
(3) The complementarity between smoking and drinking is attenuated if the cost of 
committing the annoying conduct (i.e., smoking) is high.     
Summing up the evidence presented here, overall this empirical study provides 
evidence that the high psychological cost caused by those surrounding smokers has a 
direct significant effect upon smoking behavior and, further, that it attenuate the 
complementarity between smoking and drinking, thereby reducing cigarette 
consumption.  I found that this research helps to explain one aspect of human nature 
related to social existence.  The influence of the attitude of others on a person‟s 
behavior seems apparent.  The findings derived from the current investigation using 
regression analysis can further bridge the complementary relationship between social 
norms and smoking behavior, and as such they are of value to researchers.  
 My argument is in part based on the critical assumption that as the social 
position of females improved, it more strongly affected smoking behavior.  
Nevertheless, it is not clear whether this assumption is valid.  A future direction for 
this study will be to examine how the improvement of the social position of females has 
an influence on smoking behavior and thereby helps reduces the consumption of 
cigarettes in Japan.  
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 Fig 1. Monthly expenditures on cigarettes per household.  
 
Notes: Data source is Minryoku edited by Asahi Shinbunsha. 
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 Fig 2. Monthly expenditures on cigarettes per household separately for high alcohol 
consumption area and low alcohol consumption area. 
 
Notes: Data source is Minryoku edited by Asahi Shinbunsha. 
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Fig 3. Relationship between monthly expenditures on cigarettes per household and 
alcohol consumption, separately for high alcohol consumption area and low alcohol 
consumption area. 
Notes: Data source is Minryoku edited by Asahi Shinbunsha. 
 
 
 
 
2
0
2
1
2
2
2
3
2
4
2
5
c
ig
a
2 3 4 5 6
alcol
2
0
2
1
2
2
2
3
c
ig
a
2 2.5 3 3.5 4
alcol
 Table 1  Variable definitions, means, and standard deviations. 
Variables Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
CIGA 
 
Cigarette expenditure a 9,370 12,909 
PRIC Cigarette price (Yen) 
 
227.2 13.9 
DENS Density of population(number of population 
per km2) 
623 1,060 
SN1 
 
Number of public baths 547 525 
SN2  Number of community centers 
 
377 277 
DSN1 
 
Number of population turnovers within 
prefecture b 
72.1 86.1 
DSN2 
 
Number of immigrants from other 
prefectures b 
64.0 79.9 
INCOM Regional real income a 
 
8,228 9,297 
ALCOL Alcohol consumption a 41.9 41.9 
 
SERVI 
 
Number of employments of service sector b 834.0 867.3 
CAR 
 
Number of cars b  142.8 122.2 
POP Total population b 2,645 2,387 
 
Notes:   a In Millions of Yen.   
b In 1000s. 
Values are the simple averages of the yearly values over the period 1988-2001. Data 
source is Minryoku edited by Asahi Shinbunsha. 
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Table 2.  Regression results on cigarette smoking. 
Variables (1) CIGA 
ALL 
(2)  CIGA 
  HALCOL 
(3) CIGA 
LALCOL 
(4) CIGA 
ALL 
(5) CIGA 
 HALCOL 
(6) CIGA 
LALCOL 
CIGA-1 0.12** 
(2.98) 
0.15** 
(2.76) 
0.002 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(1.60) 
0.10* 
(1.81) 
-0.02 
(-0.41) 
PRIC 
 
-30.0*107 
(-0.14) 
-135.3 
(-0.38) 
74.1 
(0.98) 
-51.6 
(-0.25) 
-35.1 
(-0.10) 
92.6 
(1.24) 
DENS 
 
-63.3*107 
(-1.24) 
-62.1 
(-0.90) 
-129.6 
(-1.39) 
-95.7* 
(-1.92) 
-72.8 
(-1.07) 
-192.4* 
(-2.18) 
SN1 -1.86 
(-0.25) 
6.08 
(0.63) 
-2.67 
(-0.44) 
-26.1** 
(-4.18) 
-20.1** 
(-2.48) 
-1.22 
(-0.21) 
SN2 -7.58 
(-0.65) 
-63.3* 
(-2.16) 
0.24 
(0.09) 
-4.23 
(-0.37) 
-71.4** 
(-2.49) 
-0.38 
(-0.15) 
DSN1 190.1** 
(4.01) 
173.9** 
(2.61) 
-138.2 
(-1.44) 
126.6** 
(2.80) 
118.1* 
(1.83) 
-135.3 
(-1.43) 
DSN2 
 
230.7** 
(3.85) 
224.9** 
(2.91) 
-98.7 
(-1.14) 
144.9** 
(2.53) 
138.1* 
(1.88) 
-130.7 
(-1.55) 
ALCOL 
 
224.9** 
(6.14) 
251.2** 
(4.79) 
-30.9 
(-1.32) 
194.2** 
(5.48) 
198.4** 
(3.95) 
-19.2 
(-0.85) 
INCOM 
 
-2.13** 
(-3.75) 
-1.44* 
(-1.93) 
-1.00 
(-1.02) 
-4.00** 
(-8.50) 
-3.02** 
(-4.65) 
-1.99* 
(-2.29) 
SERVIC 
 
-141.4** 
(-12.9) 
-129.2** 
(-8.51) 
-43.0** 
(-3.08) 
-145.3** 
(-13.6) 
-130.2** 
(-8.74) 
-38.1** 
(-2.79) 
CAR 
 
-128.5** 
(-6.19) 
-140.6** 
(-4.71) 
-67.8* 
(-2.27) 
   
POP 
 
96.6** 
(4.67) 
86.3** 
(3.06) 
47.1* 
(1.68) 
125.9** 
(6.37) 
105.2** 
(3.82) 
65.0** 
(2.41) 
Year dummy 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Second-order  
autocorrelation 
Z=0.55 
p-value=0.58 
Z=0.15 
p-value=0.88 
Z=1.61 
p-value=0.10 
Z=0.84 
p-value=0.40 
Z=0.83 
p-value=0.40 
Z=1.18 
p-value=0.23 
Sample 
Groups 
564 
47 
288 
47 
276 
47 
564 
47 
288 
47 
276 
47 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics obtained by robust standard error. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent 
levels respectively (one-sided tests).  
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Table 3.  Regression results on cigarette smoking. 
Variables (1) CIGA 
ALL 
(2)  CIGA 
  HALCOL 
(3) CIGA 
LALCOL 
(4) CIGA 
ALL 
(5) CIGA 
 HALCOL 
(6) CIGA 
LALCOL 
CIGA-1 0.11** 
(2.63) 
0.15** 
(2.54) 
-0.005 
(-0.08) 
0.06 
(1.61) 
0.11* 
(1.95) 
-0.02 
(-0.35) 
PRIC 
 
-61.1 
(-0.28) 
-179.5 
(-0.48) 
23.3 
(0.31) 
-52.0 
(-0.25) 
-70.1 
(-0.19) 
40.2 
(0.54) 
DENS 
 
-91.5* 
(-1.75) 
-87.2 
(-1.20) 
-89.9 
(-0.97) 
-128.8** 
(-2.53) 
-104.8 
(-1.47) 
-143.9* 
(-1.66) 
SN1 -11.2 
(-1.53) 
-6.63 
(-0.69) 
-2.45 
(-0.40) 
-34.3** 
(-5.42) 
-29.1** 
(-3.54) 
-1.40 
(-0.24) 
SN2 -6.94 
(-0.58) 
-56.3* 
(-1.84) 
0.81 
(-0.31) 
-4.24 
(-0.36) 
-64.5* 
(-2.16) 
-1.26 
(-0.49) 
DSN1 163.1** 
(3.30) 
121.3* 
(1.73) 
-173.1* 
(-1.81) 
87.6* 
(1.87) 
60.9 
(0.91) 
-168.1* 
(-1.77) 
DSN2 
 
215.5** 
(3.49) 
198.4** 
(2.47) 
-96.1 
(-1.11) 
127.9* 
(2.17) 
118.1 
(1.54) 
-123.5 
(-1.47) 
ALCOL-1 
 
168.5** 
(4.07) 
144.6** 
(2.39) 
37.6 
(1.56) 
107.7** 
(2.74) 
68.3 
(1.21) 
43.1* 
(1.83) 
INCOM 
 
-1.91** 
(-3.21) 
-1.31* 
(-1.65) 
-1.03 
(-1.06) 
-3.90** 
(-8.02) 
-2.88** 
(-4.25) 
-1.80* 
(-2.06) 
SERVIC 
 
-153.2** 
(-13.8) 
-140.8** 
(-8.93) 
-40.8** 
(-2.93) 
-155.3** 
(-14.3) 
-138.7** 
(-8.97) 
-36.8** 
(-2.69) 
CAR 
 
-132.5** 
(-6.05) 
-133.1** 
(-4.20) 
-52.1* 
(-1.78) 
   
POP 
 
117.1** 
(5.61) 
109.4** 
(3.72) 
33.8 
(1.21) 
149.5** 
(7.54) 
130.1** 
(4.57) 
48.8* 
(1.82) 
Year dummy 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Second-order  
autocorrelation 
Z=0.86 
p-value=0.39 
Z=0.35 
p-value=0.72 
Z=1.32 
p-value=0.18 
Z=0.44 
p-value=0.66 
Z=0.48 
p-value=0.62 
Z=0.95 
p-value=0.34 
Sample 
Groups 
564 
47 
288 
47 
276 
47 
564 
47 
288 
47 
276 
47 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics obtained by robust standard error. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent 
levels respectively (one-sided tests).  
 22 
Table 4.  Regression results on cigarette smoking. 
Variables (1) CIGA (2)  CIGA# (3) CIGA (4)  CIGA# 
CIGA-1 0.05 
(1.31) 
0.03 
(0.92) 
-0.01 
(-0.38) 
-0.02 
(0.72) 
PRIC 
 
-42.7 
(-0.02) 
-30.2 
(-0.16) 
-8.54 
(-0.04) 
-43.8 
(-0.23) 
ALCOL 
 
-37.3 
(-0.32) 
-29.3 
(-0.27) 
193.0* 
(1.79) 
149.1 
(1.48) 
DENS* 
ALCOL 
-0.15** 
(-6.46) 
-0.15** 
(-6.30) 
-0.11** 
(-5.15) 
-0.11** 
(-4.91) 
SN1* 
ALCOL 
0.10* 
(2.05) 
0.08* 
(1.80) 
-0.02 
(-0.55) 
-0.03 
(-0.77) 
SN2* 
ALCOL 
-0.28 
(-1.43) 
-0.26 
(-1.48) 
-0.58** 
(-3.06) 
-0.45** 
(-2.62) 
DSN1* 
ALCOL 
2.07** 
(6.68) 
1.94** 
(6.36) 
2.15** 
(7.14) 
2.00** 
(6.75) 
DSN2* 
ALCOL 
0.63* 
(2.14) 
0.79** 
(2.80) 
0.40 
(1.43) 
0.64** 
(2.36) 
INCOM 
 
-2.76** 
(-4.99) 
-2.65** 
(-4.84) 
-4.61** 
(-9.94) 
-4.60** 
(-10.0) 
SERVIC 
 
-137.2** 
(-13.3) 
-139.6** 
(-13.8) 
-134.4** 
(-13.4) 
-134.3** 
(-13.7) 
CAR 
 
-126.8** 
(-6.76) 
-127.2** 
(-6.97) 
  
POP 
 
68.8** 
(7.49) 
62.7** 
(7.31) 
83.1** 
(9.54) 
74.2** 
(9.02) 
Year dummy 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Second-order  
autocorrelation 
Z=0.50 
p-value=0.61 
Z=-0.63 
p-value=0.53 
Z=2.07 
p-value=0.03 
Z=-2.24 
p-value=0.02 
Sample 
Groups 
564 
47 
564 
47 
564 
47 
564 
47 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics obtained by robust standard error. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent 
levels respectively (one-sided tests).  
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Table 5.  Regression results on cigarette smoking. 
Variables (1) CIGA (2)  CIGA# (3) CIGA (4)  CIGA# 
CIGA-1 0.03 
(0.77) 
0.01 
(0.41) 
0.003 
(0.08) 
-0.004 
(-0.11) 
PRIC 
 
62.9 
(0.30) 
39.6 
(0.20) 
136.2 
(0.67) 
60.3 
(0.30) 
ALCOL-1 
 
-217.9* 
(-1.81) 
-222.4* 
(-1.97) 
94.7 
(0.84) 
41.7 
(0.39) 
DENS* 
ALCOL-1 
-0.16** 
(-5.95) 
-0.16** 
(-5.75) 
-0.11** 
(-4.07) 
-0.09** 
(-3.72) 
SN1* 
ALCOL-1 
0.03 
(0.79) 
0.01 
(0.42) 
-0.14** 
(-3.74) 
-0.16** 
(-4.25) 
SN2* 
ALCOL-1 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.07 
(0.39) 
-0.25 
(-1.19) 
-0.09 
(-0.50) 
DSN1* 
ALCOL-1 
2.41** 
(7.09) 
2.21** 
(6.66) 
2.20** 
(6.64) 
1.96** 
(6.07) 
DSN2* 
ALCOL-1 
1.06** 
(3.14) 
1.32** 
(4.08) 
0.36 
(1.13) 
0.67* 
(2.17) 
INCOM 
 
-1.69** 
(-2.92) 
-1.56** 
(-2.71) 
-4.34** 
(-8.89) 
-4.35** 
(-9.03) 
SERVIC 
 
-155.0** 
(-15.0) 
-158.0** 
(-15.5) 
-150.8** 
(-14.9) 
-151.4** 
(-15.3) 
CAR 
 
-184.5** 
(-8.59) 
-187.7** 
(-8.96) 
  
POP 
 
75.9** 
(8.06) 
68.4** 
(7.65) 
104.9** 
(12.1) 
95.9** 
(11.5) 
Year dummy 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Second-order  
autocorrelation 
Z=1.05 
p-value=0.29 
Z=-0.91 
p-value=0.36 
Z=1.13 
p-value=0.25 
Z=1.30 
p-value=0.19 
Sample 
Groups 
564 
47 
564 
47 
564 
47 
564 
47 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics obtained by robust standard error. * and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent 
levels respectively (one-sided tests).  
